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HOW ORGANIZATIONAL BOUNDARY CHOICES IMPACT CAPABILITY
DEVELOPMENT

ABSTRACT

As construction oriented public sector agencies have outsourced more and more of their
construction related activities, they have often suffered from an inability to provide appropriate
oversight due to degraded capabilities. This had led to calls for these agencies to rebuild
capabilities across different technical areas. A firm’s boundary choices – make, buy, ally and dual
modes (make and buy simultaneously) – may impact the ability of a firm to maintain and even
build new capabilities, and in this paper we seek to investigate the impact that boundary choices
have upon rebuilding capabilities and the extent to which organizations may make sub-optimal
choices economically to potentially create opportunities for learning and knowledge sharing.
Using qualitative data from three project-based public sector organizations managing large
construction projects, we observed that neither pure make nor buy decisions assisted significantly
in capability building. Dual modes provided firms with some opportunities to build capabilities,
but the most successful decisions seemed to occur in respect of using intermediate governance
modes such as alliances. We also observed that the boundary choice was just one dimension of
the capability building process and suggest organizations require a multi-pronged strategy to
rebuild capabilities over time.
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HOW ORGANIZATIONAL BOUNDARY CHOICES IMPACT CAPABILITY
DEVELOPMENT

Research concerning firms’ vertical boundaries has traditionally looked towards efficiency
arguments in terms of whether it is more efficient to undertake an activity internally relative to the
total cost of sourcing the product or service from the market.1 Transaction cost economics (TCE)
has dominated this research, highlighting the efficiency of markets in the absence of high
transaction costs driven by factors such as asset specificity, high levels of uncertainty and small
numbers bargaining (Williamson, 1975; 1985; Macher & Richman, 2008). However, an alternative
perspective highlights that a firm’s boundaries will be determined by its capabilities – that is, given
firm heterogeneity, firms will specialize in those activities where they have a comparative
advantage and attain ‘gains from trade’ by sourcing products or services from the market where
they do not have a comparative advantage (Argyres, 1996; Jacobides, 2008).
Thus, while firm capabilities provide an explanation for determining the optimal location
of a firm’s boundaries, we suggest that this relationship between capabilities and firm boundaries
is not unidirectional. That is, the choices a firm makes in terms of what it undertakes internally
versus what is sourced from the market will, over time, fundamentally impact the development of
its capabilities. At a basic level, producing a good or service internally (rather than using the
market) provides an opportunity for firms to learn and build routines as a basis for new capabilities
(Teece, 2007; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). And the use of concurrent sourcing or dual governance
modes (where a firm buys from the market and simultaneously produces it in-house) along with

1

Governance choices, firm boundaries, vertical scope and vertical architecture are all terms used within the
literature but relate to the same broad concept – what activities take place within a firm versus what takes place
external to the firm boundaries. While a number of authors (e.g. Poppo & Zenger, 2002) recognize contractual and
relational governance approaches to organizing economic activities, our focus in this paper is upon the contractual
governance approaches to determining firm boundaries.
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hybrid or network forms of governance (such as alliances or joint ventures) provide opportunities
for learning and capability building that are not stark ‘all or nothing’ choices in terms of internal
production versus outsourcing.2 It is the potential for firms to make boundary choice decisions that
are less than optimal in respect of economic efficiency as a means to build new capabilities (Bridge
& Tisdell, 2004) that provides an alternative approach to considering capabilities and firm
boundaries. In this vein, we seek to investigate the choices firms make concerning their vertical
boundaries (including the trade-offs they make), how these choices are operationalized in terms of
their day to day activities and the impact these boundary choices have upon the actual development
of new capabilities.
We present four possible vertical boundary choices – make, buy, intermediate governance
modes and dual governance modes. Existing literature tends to focus upon the rationale for such
choices rather than the impact that these choices will have upon subsequent capability development
(Jacobides & Winter, 2005; Makadok & Coff, 2009; Parmiagini & Mitchell, 2009). In a strategic
sense, we are primarily interested in how boundary choice decisions are made, along with the
actual management of these firm boundaries over time, to build or rebuild capabilities that will
directly impact firm efficiency and competitiveness.
In respect of our empirical setting, the emergence of New Public Management (Pollitt &
Bouckaert 2000, English 2005) has seen government agencies pull back their corporate boundaries
through outsourcing and divestment of core activities (Young, 2007). Agencies that have
previously been tasked with construction activities as an example, no longer complete any
construction and instead manage a plethora of contractors. In some cases, the outcome is a
misalignment between an organisation’s capabilities and the agency’s mandate. At a practical level

2

Makadok and Coff (2009) also distinguish intermediate modes from hybrids in that hybrids are market like in some
dimensions (ownership, rewards and authority), but hierarchy like in others.
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the result has been a number of failed projects and select agencies have been tasked with increasing
their capabilities significantly. The need to (re)build organisational capabilities in the construction
industry has been clearly identified (Hartmann, Davies & Frederiksen, 2010) whilst maintaining
high levels of efficiency and thus this paper considers the specific issue of how organizational
boundary choices has impacted the capability development process in select construction oriented
public sector agencies.

FIRM BOUNDARIES, CAPABILITIES AND LEARNING
Building (or rebuilding) capabilities has been a popular topic of research within the capabilities
and the learning literatures. The focus over time has seemingly become more micro with a stream
of literature concerning the microfoundations of capabilities (e.g. Teece, 2007; Felin et al., 2012).
Coupled with such studies is a focus on learning (e.g. Zollo & Winter, 2002; Styhre, Josephson &
Knauseder, 2004) and the role of the individuals in the decision-making process (e.g. Corner &
Wu, 2012; Dahlander, O’Mahony & Gann, 2016).
Whether a firm should undertake an activity or outsource to the market has traditionally
been determined by the presence of a comparative advantage in respect of a particular activity,
thus linking firm boundaries and capabilities (Argyres, 1996; Araujo, Dubois & Gadde, 2003).
However, the relationship is not unidirectional. The location of firm boundaries and the nature of
these boundaries is a key determinant of whether a firm may engage in the learning and
establishment of routines that form the basis of new capabilities (Bredillet, Tywoniak &
Tootoonchy, 2018). It is this ‘reverse’ relationship (ie that boundary choices impact capability
development) that we investigate.
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Current explanations for the location of firm vertical boundaries have emerged from a
variety of perspectives including seminal organizational theory models that focused on the
coordination of tasks and activities (Katz & Kahn 1966; Lawrence & Lorsch 1967; Thompson
1967), to theories of economic organisation focused on property rights and transaction costs
(Alchian & Demsetz 1972; Grossman & Hart 1986; Jensen & Meckling 1976; Williamson 1975),
and strategic theories of resources, capabilities and knowledge (Barney 1995; Foss 2002; Teece,
Pisano & Shuen 1997). There is also the potential to distinguish between contractual and relational
governance in terms of where to establish a firm’s vertical scope (Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Zheng,
Roehrich & Lewis, 2008; Cao & Lumineau, 2015). Here we focus on contractual governance,
though invariably in determining whether to engage in an exchange, relational governance would
be considered.
Focussing on contractual governance explanations, contemporary research is dominated by
two broad conversations. The first one is informed by TCE and is primarily concerned with the
vertical scope of the firm: where to draw organizational boundaries in order to minimise costs at a
given time point. Whenever the combined costs of internal production and coordination are less
than the suppliers’ cost of production plus the corresponding transaction costs, firms should
perform activities in-house (Williamson, 1975, 1985). The second conversation is informed by
theory concerning capabilities, knowledge and learning, and suggests that due to the heterogeneous
distribution of capabilities across an industry, the presence of particular capabilities that create the
basis for a comparative advantage determines firm boundaries. Some authors (e.g. Jacobides &
Winter, 2005; Argyres & Zenger, 2012) have discussed how transaction costs and capabilities
interact to determine a firm’s vertical boundaries. In this section we present a review of the salient
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elements of each of these two research traditions in respect of how boundary choices may directly
or indirectly impact capability development.
These perspectives provide a theoretical rationale for a variety of boundary choices – make,
buy, ally (intermediate governance modes) and concurrent sourcing (dual governance modes).
However, each of these boundary choices will then impact the extent to which firms may build (or
rebuild) capabilities. In the following section we discuss these four boundary choices in terms of
their impact upon learning and thus the potential to use these in a strategic manner to build
capabilities over time.

Buy
TCE suggests that when external suppliers have a comparative cost advantage, provided that there
is no major threat of holdup, then the firm should buy in the goods or services considered, rather
than attempt to perform the activity in-house (Williamson, 1975). However, firms that move
various activities from internal production to external suppliers will see their capabilities in respect
of these activities wither over time (Collis, 1994). The firm may retain an element of capability,
but it will weaken significantly in due course as structures change, cultures adapt and critical
employees leave (Grant, 1996a).
The potential for gains from trade is likely to limit the efforts a firm makes to build
capabilities for non-core activities. However, a firm moving into an entirely new activity may still
find opportunities for learning even if it uses a buy option. There may be some limited knowledge
leakage (Hamel, 1991; Inkpen, 2005), and whilst its productive capabilities may not change, at a
minimum, the firm should learn about existing industry standards, technology and appropriate
pricing of the activity. The need to minimize the risk of cheating encourages firms to learn about
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various dimensions of the market. Firms pursuing a ‘buy’ strategy will at best know enough to
engage efficiently with the market, but will not build any significant capabilities.

Make
Conversely, firms should undertake in-house activities that are considered to be core business,
where the firm has a comparative advantage, or the transaction costs involved in using the market
exceed internal production costs (Williamson, 1975). Internal production will allow firms to
entrench certain routines and develop capabilities over time. Thus the make option provides firms
with classic learning opportunities akin to the experience curve (Henderson, 1984). Capabilities
are continually developed within the firm: “know-how is held as trade secrets, and has been
developed from longer experience than competitors in experimenting with the many combinations
of parameters of the process” (Argyres, 1996:143). Firms may build new capabilities through
exploration whereby they actively seek to learn (Brady & Davies, 2004). Hence, there are tradeoff between gains from trade (contracting with a more efficient provider) and a purposeful ‘make’
strategy seeking to develop capabilities that are perceived to be desirable.

Intermediate Governance Modes
The intermediate governance mode or network enables a firm to use a combination of incentives
to govern a particular transaction with a single economic actor (Makadok & Coff, 2009;
Williamson, 1991). These modes refer to a single transaction where the product or service is
produced via a strategic alliance, whilst dual modes see the options of make and buy applied to
different transactions, but for the same activity. There is considerable literature concerning how
alliances can lead to knowledge transfer and learning (Rice et al., 2012; Inkpen, 2005). Beyond
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any planned knowledge sharing, there is always a degree of knowledge spillovers such that
interconnected firms will generally experience greater erosion of rents owing to imitation (Lavie,
2006: 649) and as such, by forming alliances, interconnected firms can gain access to resources
without paying full acquisition costs.
Strategic theories focused on knowledge and learning provide clear rationales for the
existence of alliances as an economically efficient governance mode (Grant, 1996b). As there is
never a perfect congruence between the activity boundaries of the firm and the knowledge
boundaries of the firm, opportunities exist for alliances. The suggested implication is increasing
cooperation with other organizations to engage in activities and access resources, including
knowledge, outside their own boundaries (Grant & Baden-Fuller 2004). However, strategic
theories of capabilities and knowledge do not address how the knowledge actually flows between
organisations and implicitly treat knowledge like other tradeable assets without delving into the
complexities of transferring knowledge between organisations (Grant & Baden-Fuller 2004).

Dual Governance Modes
Since Harrigan’s (1984) work on taper integration, it has been recognized that firms do in fact
use dual governance modes whereby they simultaneously make and buy (concurrent sourcing)
and make and sell (concurrent exploitation) the same product or service. These dual modes are
independent and stable choices (as opposed to transitory phenomena) that enable a firm to utilize
both the market and hierarchy simultaneously. The existence of dual modes cannot be explained
using TCE principles and thus alternative explanations rely on alternative mechanisms, including
learning and capability development (Jacobides & Billiniger, 2006; Krzeminska, Hoetker &
Mellewigt, 2013; Parmigiani & Mitchell, 2009).
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Dual modes provide firms with learning opportunities from both their own activities and
suppliers/buyers. In addition to experience curve effects, the firm is able to build absorptive
capacity thereby enhancing their capacity to assimilate new knowledge from suppliers (Lane &
Lubatkin, 1998; Jansen, van den Bosch, & Volberda, 2005). Hence, firms will learn which
activities provide the best opportunities for further gains from specialization. “Concurrent sourcing
opens the firm to learning arising from the spillovers from related components and different
production methods of the firm and its suppliers” (Parmigiani & Mitchell, 2009: 1067). Over time,
changes in the capability distribution within the industry provide feedback regarding the
appropriateness of their relationship with suppliers – “firms need to make in order to know …
[but] firms do not need to make all of their components to know enough to outsource” (Parmigiani
& Mitchell, 2009: 1067).
Taken together, different governance modes have been linked to learning and/or capability
development. This is most overtly seen in the strategic alliance literature where a body of work
has evolved around ‘learning alliances’ (Khanna, Gulati & Nohria, 1998; Inkpen, 2005; Howard,
Steensma & Lyles, 2016). Similarly, in considering the make option, there is considerable work
concerning how firms learn through doing3. Kogut and Zander (1992) look specifically at how
combinative capabilities may derive from both internal and external learning and the role that the
make versus buy decision may have upon this learning. Finally, the dual-mode literature is the
least expansive and the links between this mode and capability building is limited. Nevertheless,
Parmigiani and Mitchell (2009) highlight the desire for learning within the firm and learning about
the market (suppliers, standards and prices) to explain why firms may make and buy an input
product or service simultaneously.

3

See Dodgson (1993) for a review of the early work on learning by doing.
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Thus, the TCE and the capabilities literature provide a theoretical logic for different vertical
boundary choices and their management over time. And literature concerning capability building
and learning considers how this may occur – including issues relating to knowledge spillovers,
learning by doing and absorptive capacity. This paper extends this line of thinking to explicitly
consider the following research questions:
Research Question 1: How do organizations’ boundary choices impact organizational efforts at
(re-)building capabilities?
Research Question 2: What other organizational choices impacted efforts to (re-) build
capabilities?

METHODS, DATA AND CONTEXT
This research involves three case studies of Australian government organizations.

These

organizations – the West Australian Department of Housing and Works (DHW), the Main Roads
Department of Western Australia (MRWA) and the Queensland Department of Main Roads
(QMR) – are all involved in the building and maintenance of major infrastructure projects such as
roads, bridges and tunnels in the case of the roads specific departments, and hospitals, schools and
major government buildings for the ‘works’ department. As outlined in each case study below,
these organizations have witnessed a significant shift in the location of their boundaries and in two
cases, major reports have recommended that they need to rebuild relevant capabilities following
the review of a number of projects.
The advantages of using these three case studies was that they approximate to something
akin to a natural experiment and their selection in the study was due to their similarity in respect
of their activities and the fact that they made different boundary choices. The organizations are all
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overseeing large scale construction projects and use many of the same contractors. But they also
demonstrate different boundary choices in action. DHW is dominated by make or buy boundary
choices; QMR often relied upon dual-modes; whilst MRWA used intermediate governance modes
in the form of alliances. Faced with similar institutional environments, organizational structures
(as government departments) and operating in very similar industries, these cases provided an
opportunity to investigate the role of boundary choices and their impact upon building
organizational capabilities.
Data was obtained via 34 interviews (minimum of ten per organization) of approximately
one hour with key internal and external stakeholders (suppliers/contractors). We committed to
undertake a minimum of 10 interviews per organization and data saturation was achieved within
this number. Supplementary data came from secondary data sources including websites, annual
reports and documentation of procedures. These were used as background information and assisted
contextualizing the data. To ensure that we had not misinterpreted any of the material, we
presented detailed reports concerning all of our analysis and our finding to each organization in
draft form and made some minor adjustments on the basis of this feedback.
To ensure that we spoke to the most appropriate people, the project sponsors in each
organization recommended various employees as well as recommending different contractors/
suppliers. This purposive sampling of participants enabled us to gain a variety of perspectives on
some of the most relevant processes and thus yield rich data for the development of the case
studies (Cresswell, 2002). Following the initial interviews, we immediately started analyzing
data and based decisions about what data to collect next on this analysis, thus providing valuable
clues about missing data and shaping theoretical sampling (Miller, Dingwall & Murphy, 2004).
We initially used open coding for preliminary categorizing and analyszing the data. This
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identified key themes that existing across the data in respect of the central research questions.
Rearranging the data into blocks according to the results of the initial coding process allowed us
to develop further insights and thus is was through axial coding that additional connections
between categories were identified. Constant comparative method underpinned the process
(Dey, 2004) and finally selective coding was applied whereby we selecting the core concept and
decided what was required to fill in gaps in categories that required further refinement. Once no
further data was required to fill in gaps and the same issues continued to be presented, we
recognized that we had reached saturation. Final key coding categories can be seen in Tables 1, 2
and 34.NVivo™ was chosen as the preferred analysis software because of its ability to assist in
the maintenance of large data sets. Coding was undertaken by one team member and then
reviewed by another team member to ensure that they ‘made sense’ as a means of ensuring interrater reliability (Charmaz, 1990).
The resulting cases provide the rich data (Siggelkow, 2007; Burton & Galvin, 2018)
required to understand the second order complexity of knowledge processes which are
contextualised in social and cultural experiences (Tywoniak 2007). The choice of three
comparable, rich case studies gives us interesting insights into the experiences of those in
organizations that are seeking to rebuild their capabilities through purposeful boundary choices.

CASE STUDIES
Department of Housing and Works (WA)
Of the three organizations that formed part of this research, DHW had undergone the most
significant changes. It had evolved from the original Department of Works in Western Australia

4

The codes shown in the tables are the sub-set that relate to this research paper and a much larger set of codes was
used across the entire project to meet the needs of the organizations.
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having been responsible for building much of the major government infrastructure for the better
part of two centuries. Starting in the 1980s, there was a shift towards greater outsourcing. Different
parts of the organisation were shifted to other agencies and an increasing number of activities were
outsourced.
At present, the DHW primarily manages contracts. Other government departments form
the client base. For example, when the Department of Education needs a new school or the Health
Department has funding to build a new hospital, they use DHW to manage the entire process.
DHW then outsources the vast majority of the activities associated with the design, project
management and building of the required infrastructure.
Following some notable problems in some high profile buildings and a change in
government, DHW implemented a ‘Review and Rebuild’ strategy in 2008. It was recognized that
the organization was losing a significant portion of its corporate knowledge each year as highly
skilled long-serving employees retired. Often these employees had come from a technical
background, the fact that they might have initially entered the organization as an architect or an
engineer meant that they had a capacity to work with contractors and sort out issues before they
became problems.
There are a number of strands to the ‘Review and Rebuild’ strategy. Significant efforts
have been made to work with other public sector agencies such as the Department of Planning and
Infrastructure and MRWA. This includes formal processes such as the creation of a central Office
of Strategic Projects to assist with major projects (such as a new teaching hospital) and more
informal processes such as networking events for relevant project managers.
There has been little in the way of changing the boundaries of the organization with the
vast majority of activities directly relating to designing and building completed by contractors.
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There are some limited efforts to bring some of the preliminary or complementary work back inhouse. For example, in respect of meeting certain sustainability targets, DHW is doing a small
amount of the work and using consultants on more specialized projects. This is also being tried in
other preliminary design related activities – “Sustainability is one area we are putting in some
effort, but there’s many other facets of design that we’re not able to put the same effort of resources
in and so there are large gaps. Heritage has been variable, but it’s less well resourced, also it’s
a specialised area. Then there’s everything, remediation, pollution, are all related to sites and …
there is no expertise”.
There have been significant attempts to learn from contractors as part of the ‘Review and
Rebuild’ strategy such as the introduction of much more detailed project reviews. These however,
have been fairly unsuccessful at helping to build organizational knowledge. First, little real effort
was put into the reviews with people customising them as they see fit – “Because you allow that
customisation, I guess you then get different firms, and different project managers, who have a
different perspective on what they want, and what they expect”. Secondly, the pace of work is such
that there is little time for reflection and subsequent action – “People don’t do a job and then start
the next one... they’ve always got six, or eight, or ten on the run at once”. In addition, employees
tend to work individually on projects so they have little opportunity to learn from other projects
unless a formal evaluation review is shared amongst a larger group – “each project manager is
basically his own little island and his or her team”.
The other key reason why so little knowledge is assimilated by DHW from their various
contracting efforts is the actual nature of the contracts used. The principal determinant for selecting
a contractor is the price – “So there’s a lot of pressure on us, generally speaking, to bottom trawl,
to have the cheapest price”. Contractors submit tenders that include virtually no margin and work
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on the (commonly correct) assumption that there will be some change in scope or specifications
for which they will be able to invoice separately and this is where they will make their margin.
The result is that there is simply no organizational slack such that contractors can spend time
working with DHW in a way that will help them rebuild some capabilities.
The boundary choices of outsourcing much of the work and trying to learn from some
contractors has not been successful in the main. And even when activities are undertaken
internally, they tend to not result in organization-wide capability development as the learning tends
to stop at the individual involved. Key findings can be seen below in Table 1.

< < - - - Insert Table 1 around here - - > >

Queensland Department of Main Roads (QMR)
Of all the states in Australia, Queensland has been the least aggressive in pursuing out-sourcing
amongst its various government agencies. They have been slow to follow this global trend and as
a result are envied by agencies across many other states due to their ability to still take a lead role
in a variety of standards or process related discussions with industry bodies.
Nevertheless, there has been a significant shift in the design of the organization with the
construction component being corporatized (ie they were structured to operate in a manner similar
to a commercial firm and to pay a dividend to the government). This shift started in the 1980’s
when QMR began to initiate a change in their structure to split the department into two sections:
Main Roads (QMR) and RoadTek. QMR was responsible for much of the design and recording of
standards and specifications which they maintain through a comprehensive set of manuals.
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RoadTek was responsible for the physical building of the projects and contract themselves back to
QMR. Employees were allocated a division in which to work.
Even with this arrangement, over the last two decades more and more work has been
outsourced to private contractors. Respondents indicated that it used to be the case that 80 percent
of project work was done through RoakTek and 20 percent outsourced. The situation is now
revered with 80 percent of work being outsourced.
The knowledge that is created through projects and specific research undertaken internally
is shared and eventually forms the basis for enhanced capabilities through a number of
mechanisms. There are formal communities of practice which have been very successful, smaller
technical forums and an annual technology transfer forum held in Brisbane annually for
participants from all the regions. There are also structures and systems in place such as always
trying to puts pairs of people or groups of three on a project, structured mentoring programs and
the creation of a culture where people are very happy to share information.
There is less success with building capabilities in respect of outsourced work. With respect
to big projects there are formal systems in place – “... there are formal meetings with the
representatives; it’s all documented in minutes”. The problem is that this tends not to be
internalized – “...here’s the explicit knowledge, and here’s the tacit knowledge and then how do
we bring it into, so it becomes tacit knowledge, you know, for others and passing it on. So we’ve
got to be thinking about how do we pass on information, not plonking it somewhere, and that’s
what we do – we put it somewhere and then expect people to go and find it for themselves”.
There are some exceptions to this where due to the relationships in place there are
meaningful learnings emerging out of the work done by the private contractors – “I was at a
learnings workshop a couple of weeks ago for a very large project and all of the presenters, or
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bar one or two, were private industry people, and they had an attitude of sharing that even with
their competitors. They’re not sharing financial commercial in confidence information ... it
[could] be just a simple technical construction issue or a design issue or it can be something much
broader”.
The choice to make and buy certain activities simultaneously has had limited success in
terms of building capabilities. There were select examples where QMR sought to explicitly learn
from contractors and incorporate this knowledge into their own similar activities. However, in the
main, using outside contractors was undertaken to achieve economic efficiencies and the
continuance of internal operations whilst the majority of the activity occurred externally was more
likely to see QMR assume the position of an ‘informed buyer’. The key findings for QMR are
shown below in Table 2.

< < - - - Insert Table 2 around here - - > >

Main Roads Western Australia (MRWA)
Up until the 1980s MRWA had total control over the design and construction of roads. Over time
more work was outsourced such that by the 1990s as much as 60 percent of work was handled by
contractors. A further push to outsourcing work was made under the State Government’s economic
rationalist reform agenda – resulting in significant staff reductions. In 2001 a Ministerial report
recognized that this has severely compromised MRWA’s capacity to operate and recommended
that Main Roads rebuild about 25 percent of its in-house design capacity, so that it was not just an
‘informed buyer’, but a partner in the State road industry. This paved the way for a move towards
relationship contracting and particularly alliancing. A new Commissioner was hired who brought
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with him a wealth of contracting experience and knowledge about relationship contracting and in
a little under three years from the influential report, MRWA entered its first (rather prescriptive)
alliance contract.
Before covering the alliance contacts used, it is worth noting that the majority of work done
by MRWA is still smaller scale projects that are either completed in-house in respect of
establishing standards or are outsourced and a project manager oversees them from the perspective
of MRWA. Similar to the previous two cases, the extent to which there is any learning from the
contractor very much depends upon the relationship that exists.
In comparison, alliance contracts – which apply to the largest of contracts – seem to be
considerably more successful. The awarding of alliance contracts are based on multiple criteria
including the reputation of the alliance partners rather than being based entirely upon cost. Even
the final cost is often not determined until after the contract has been signed and preliminary design
work is completed (though there is always an accepted formula or system for determining the
eventual cost that is agreed to in advance). In essence, a key driver for MRWA is to build the best
possible roads for the community and they seek alliance partners who can bring innovation to each
project (Edmonds, 2007). While alliances are primarily risk/reward-sharing arrangements, they
afford the opportunity for both public and private partners to engage in projects larger than any
one entity would be able to undertake on their own. Thus alliances provide capacity building
potential for all individuals and organizations involved – something that is not inherent in
conventional contracting arrangements.
At the start of each project, an independent alliance facilitator works with the alliance
management team to determine goals, including a commitment that everyone will exit the alliance
with enhanced knowledge and skills. This process involves establishing explicit non-cost key
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performance indicators (such as training), which are measured and rewarded by the client as part
of the contract. Thus there is a clearly articulated learning agenda.
Alliance partners agree that the biggest challenge in establishing an alliance partnership is
bringing people from different organisations together to think as one. Another key issue is that
alliance contractors may require the use of key personal for many years and employees are not
replaced in MRWA while they are working away from the department on the alliance contract.
However, involvement in an alliance contract is an invaluable source of knowledge for the
employee and the department – “The learning has been huge… and importantly we are
documenting everything we do and feeding that back into Main Roads”.
When alliance members return to the parent organisation they take with them invaluable
knowledge not only about the practice of constructing a particular road, but also about the way
that alliance partners think and the collaborative, problem solving processes involved to achieve
the outcome. Documenting the alliance experience embellishes knowledge which flows back to
the organisation through other conduits like formal reporting, designs and the Technical Advisory
Group. People entering new alliances have described the knowledge gleaned from the documented
processes of previous alliances as invaluable. Many employees see the exchange of ideas, the
flexibility to resolve differences of opinion and innovate in the open environment of the alliance
as a very healthy way of building knowledge. This is particularly effective because feedback loops
are being developed and this new knowledge challenges existing, traditional thinking within the
parent organization. Employees involved with developing and implementing design standards see
great benefits flowing back to their team.
MRWA employees have a range of opinions about the effectiveness of alliancing and views
differ depending on whether or not people have been involved in an alliance. One Main Roads
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alliance said “I didn’t think that the knowledge and skills transfer would work the way people told
me it would, but I have learnt a huge amount about how contractors work and I have taught the
contractors about how Main Roads works and there has been an enormous transfer of knowledge”.
The key findings for MRWA are shown below in Table 3.

< < - - - Insert Table 3 around here - - > >

DISCUSSION
In considering whether organizations make strategic vertical boundary choices to rebuild
capabilities and whether these vertical boundary choices involve trading-off short-term
efficiencies for learning opportunities we considered four boundary choices. The three case studies
discussed do not present pure and discrete cases of different boundary choices, however, many of
the decisions were unique and provide a very useful starting point for better understanding the
choices organizations make in respect of their boundaries, how they operationalize these choices
and the impact they have upon the organization. A summary of these choices and their impact
upon capability building is shown in Table 4.

< < - - - Insert Table 4 around here - - > >

Boundary Choices and Capability Building
In respect of Research Question 1 – how organizations’ boundary choices impact efforts to (re)build capabilities, it was clear that the four different boundary choices presented very different
outcomes. Not unexpectedly, the option to buy a product or service did not provide an opportunity
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to learn from contractors. As the knowledge on the part of the contractor was embedded in the
organization, being largely tacit in nature and entrenched within a dominant culture, it was
inevitably difficult to transfer without a comprehensive appreciation of the context of the
knowledge (Soo et al., 2002). And on the recipient side of the equation, the lack of relevant internal
knowledge (Davies & Brady, 2016) limited absorptive capacity (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998) or
receptivity (Hamel, 1991) led to an inability to understand what the other party was doing, as well
as not being able to understand the process leading to the other party’s knowledge development.
Thus without existing knowledge and routines relating to a specific activity, it was challenging to
acquire knowledge and build new capabilities – as was seen very clearly in the case of DHW.
In comparison, the make strategy did provide opportunities for the development of
capabilities though learning by doing whereby explicit knowledge becomes internalised by staff
and adds to their tacit knowledge (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). DHW attempted to bring additional
activities in-house such as sustainability, heritage and environmental reporting. However, without
an existing knowledge base or relationships with contractors in these areas, there were limited
opportunities to learn other than through trial and error. In essence, expanding the firm boundaries
and bringing an activity into the organization does not suddenly (or even slowly) guarantee new
capabilities (Wohlgemuth & Wenzel, 2016). Instead, we observed inefficiencies (relative to what
was achieved when the activity was outsourced) and slow progress in respect of capability
building.
It was not obvious as to why QMR followed a dual mode strategy in respect of their
boundary management. The most likely explanations from the earlier discussion center on
information asymmetries (Heide, 2003), performance uncertainty given the complex nature of the
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products or services (Novak & Eppinger, 2001), and opportunities to learn (Parmigiani & Mitchell,
2009).
Where dual-modes were employed, the decision to buy seemed to be based on efficiency
and budget constraints, whilst the decision to simultaneously make provided a deep understanding,
of the activity as a basis for managing the outsourcing contracts efficiently. However, there were
also clear examples of QMR choosing to undertake an activity internally so that they could learn
and build this learning into their operations when more and more of this particular activity was
being outsourced. Thus the logic concerning why an organization might take a potentially
economic inefficient position by utilizing a make and buy choice for the same product or service
in terms of learning and building absorptive capacity (Jansen et al., 2005; Parmiagiani & Mitchell,
2009) did hold in this case.
Intermediate governance modes were most obvious in the form of alliance contracting as
seen primarily in the case of MRWA. These were used for the largest projects and could be
understood in terms of managing risk. By providing incentives for a range of outcomes that varied
between the hard-to-motivate and the easy-to-motivate tasks, they limited opportunism through
quasi-hierarchical authority and simultaneously delivered a degree of autonomy beyond that
experienced with a hierarchy (Dyer & Singh, 2008; Oxley & Sampson, 2004).
These alliance contracts came at significant cost in that they were never established purely
on the basis of efficiency and they purposefully incorporated a range of key performance indicators
around knowledge transfer and learning. Some employees physically moved out of MRWA
facilities for extended periods and the financial uncertainty associated with these projects was
significant. Yet the results in terms of (re-)building capabilities were very positive. The physical
co-location and joint activities provided a platform for tacit and explicit knowledge transfer
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(Nonaka, 1994). Undertaking activities jointly presented the contextualization for effective
learning that was not available through other boundary choices.

Organization Operations Choices and Capability Building
In respect of the second research question – what other organizational choices impacted efforts to
(re-)build capabilities – a range of management initiatives enhanced or restricted the effectiveness
of capability building efforts. Management support for developing capabilities was seen in the
creation of structures, processes and support systems for learning. Such commitment manifested
itself in a variety of ways including, the establishment of mentoring programs, internal training
and development programs, communities of practice and informal knowledge transfer networks
(Grigoriou & Rothaermel, 2017). One distinguishing factor between QMR’s and DHW’s attempt
to rebuild capabilities was the desire and clarity around the strategy for rebuilding. Hamel (1991)
suggests that knowledge acquisition requires intent on the part of management in the form of a
learning agenda and support by senior management. “Without clear corporate goals for
competence building, and a deep appreciation for the critical contribution of core competence
leadership to long-term competitiveness, individual businesses appeared unlikely to devote
resource to the task of learning” (Hamel 1991: 92). QMR’s extensive communities of practice,
informal systems to bring people together and formalized communications both within the
organization as well as with suppliers emphasizes their intent.
In addition, social processes, like trust, were critical as contractual governance is unable to
sufficiently safeguard against exchange hazards associated with information exchange to get
people to commit to fully engaging in capability development activities (Zheng et al., 2008;
Geneste & Galvin, 2015). As a number of respondents indicated, knowledge is power and thus,
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you do not willingly give it up if you do not trust how you will be valued in the future: the
contractual governance processes tried to create boundaries for relational governance such as
formalizing the expectations around learning and collaboration.
Considering those factors that restricted capability building, the lack of slack resources that
allow for staff to engage in learning and work with other parties was critical. Thus in the case of
DHW, the focus on price meant that contactors did not have the capacity to work with the project
manager from the government agency. It also created an adversarial relationship that went against
the need to create trust in the relationship to allow for knowledge transfer. Finally, as previously
alluded to, absorptive capacity and co-location were critical. If organizations “need to make in
order to know” (Parmigiani & Mitchell, 2009: 1067) then simply using the market to provide
certain products and services will never provide the basis for this absorptive capacity, or the
socialization opportunities for inter-organizational knowledge sharing and learning. This was a
key reason why the MRWA alliance contracts were so successful in helping to rebuild capabilities.

CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper investigates the impact of organizational boundary choices on the capability
development process in organizations. Our findings and discussion reveal two contributions: first,
we build on existing literature to show how boundary choices impact the capability development
(RQ1); second, our research identifies various management activities and decisions that enhance
or restrict the relationship between boundary choices and capability development (RQ2).
This paper presents different boundary choices (make, buy, intermediate governance
modes and dual governance modes) and considers how such choices may potentially impact the
(re-)building of firm capabilities. Outside of the make option, all other governance modes provide
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particular pathways to capability development and we sought to investigate how these were used
and their effectiveness across three construction oriented public sector organizations. For
managers, what was perhaps most revealing were the results for the intermediate governance
modes and the dual modes. In the case of dual modes, the decision to use the market for some
production of a service or activity has been proffered as potential source of learning. “When a firm
concurrently sources, learning will be enhanced, since it gains both the deep tacit knowledge of
internal production and the broader, more diverse understanding from external supply
relationships” (Parmigiani, 2007: 292). For the purposes of building capabilities it seemed that the
‘deep tacit knowledge’ was key and the use of the market was done more for efficiency reasons
and resource limitations (ie government dictated staff limitations) than for any logic concerning
learning. In comparison, the choice of intermediate governance modes was undertaken specifically
for the purposes of learning and the manner by which opportunism was limited through alliance
contracts was something of a by-product of pursuing explicit learning goals. It was only through
intermediate governance choices that new capabilities were able to be developed that were not
generated internally. Nevertheless, the strategic use of these specific boundary choices were only
a partial solution to rebuilding capabilities. Therefore we show how different strategic boundary
choices impact capability building, providing an answer to RQ1.
While boundary decisions were shown to be important determinants in the capability
building process, this was only half of the story. From a management perspective it is this other
half of the process concerning how the boundaries were actually managed that represents
opportunities to make significant changes within firms. Considering dimensions such as intent,
embeddedness, receptivity and internalization, it was clear that the same boundary choices may
have different outcomes in-line with variations across these dimensions.

Interestingly, the
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boundary choice decisions are made by senior managers. However, the boundary management
processes are actioned largely at middle management levels. Examples of communities of practice
were seen in two organizations, yet these were not initially supported by top management and in
one case, they survived their first years by their champions pursuing their agenda under a quality
banner. Overall, firms make trade-offs in respect of economically efficient boundary choices and
choices that may provide opportunities for capability development. The success of firms following
these sub-optimal boundary choices were, however, significantly tempered by the boundary
management processes utilized by the organizations (thereby addressing RQ2).
This research suffers from the obvious limitations of single case studies for the different
boundary choices, a unique setting in time in terms of the desire by all of the selected organizations
to rebuild their capabilities that may have tempered the extent to which boundary choices may be
used strategically. And the cases themselves were not as similar to each other as initially hoped,
given our preference to create a natural experiment. However, we would suggest that future
research efforts should not focus upon overcoming these limitations, but rather look more deeply
at contextual factors and the micro-processes concerning how firms build capabilities through
specific boundary choices over time. For example, how do firms move away from pure make or
buy boundary choices in terms of the types of activities (core versus peripheral; product versus
service, simple versus complex) that use dual or hybrid governance modes? How do these initial
changes create trajectories in terms of subsequent changes in respect of boundary choices? And
are these dual and hybrid governance modes temporary aberrations that may be utilized to rebuild
capabilities before either bring the product or service back entirely in-house, or now that they are
an informed buyer, go back to using the market? Strategically varying am organization’s boundary
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choices may be part of the process for rebuilding firm capabilities, but delving deeper in when,
where and how would be a useful extension to this research agenda.

REFERENCES
Alchian, A.A. & Demsetz, H. 1972. Production, information costs, and economic organization.
The American Economic Review, 62(5): 777-95.
Araujo, L., Dubois, A. & Gadde, L.E. 2004. The multiple boundaries of the firm. Journal of
Management Studies, 40(5): 1255-1277.
Argyres, N. 1996. Evidence on the Role of Firm Capabilities in Vertical Integration Decisions.
Strategic Management Journal, 17(2): 129-150.
Argyres, N.S. & Zenger, T.R. 2012. Capabilities, transaction costs, and firm boundaries.
Organization Science, 23(6), 1643-1657.
Barney, J.B. 1995, Looking inside for competitive advantage. Academy of Management
Executive, 9(4): 49-61.
Brady, T. & Davies, A. 2004. Building project capabilities: from exploratory to exploitative
learning. Organization Studies, 25(9): 1601-1621.
Bredillet, C. Tywoniak, S. Tootoonchy, M. 2018. Exploring the dynamics of project
management office and portfolio management co-evolution: A routine lens. International
Journal of Project Management, 36(1), 27-42
Bridge, A. J., & Tisdell, C. (2004). The determinants of the vertical boundaries of the
construction firm. Construction Management and Economics, 22(8), 807-825.

Page28

Burton, N., & Galvin, P. 2018. Using template and matrix analysis: A case study of management
and organisation history research. Qualitative Research in Organizations and
Management: An International Journal. https://doi.org/10.1108/QROM-04-2018-1626.
Cao, Z. & Lumineau, F. 2015. Revisiting the interplay between contractual and relational
governance: a qualitative and meta-analytic investigation. Journal of Operations
Management, 33/34: 15-42.
Charmaz, K. 1990. Discovering' chronic illness: Using grounded theory. Social Science &
Medicine, 30(11): 1161-1172.
Collis, D.J. 1994. How Valuable are Organizational Capabilities? Strategic Management
Journal, 15: 143–152
Corner P.D. & Wu S. 2012. Dynamic capability emergence in the venture creation process.
International Small Business Journal, 30(2):138-160.
Creswell, J.W. 2002. Educational research: Planning, conducting, and evaluating quantitative
and qualitative research. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Merrill-Prentice Hall.
Dahlander, L., O’Mahony, S. & Gann, D.M. 2014. One foot in, one foot out: how does
individuals’ external search breadth affect innovation outcomes. Strategic Management
Journal, 37(2): 280-302.
Davies, A. & Brady, T. 2016. Explicating the dynamics of project capabilities. International
Journal of Project Management, 34(2): 314-327.
Dey, I. 2004. Grounded theory. In Qualitative research practice, ed. C. Seale, G. Gobo, J. F.
Gubrium and D. Silverman, 80-93. London: Sage.
Dodgson, M. 1993. Organizational learning: a review of some literature. Organization Studies,
14(3): 375-394.
Dyer, J.H., & Singh, H. 1998. The relational view: Cooperative strategy and sources of
interorganizational competitive advantage. Academy of Management Review, 23: 660–
680.
Edmonds, L. 2007. The vital link: The transition years - Main Roads Western Australia 19962006. Perth. Main Roads Western Australia.
Page29

Eisenhardt K.M. & Martin J.A. 2000. Dynamic capabilities: What are they? Strategic Management
Journal. 21: 1105-1121.
English, L.M. 2005, 'Using public-private partnerships to achieve value for money in the delivery
of healthcare in Australia', International Journal of Public Policy, 1(1/2):. 91-121.
Felin T., Foss N.J., Heimeriks K.H. & Madsen T. 2012. Microfoundations of routines and
capabilities: individuals, processes, and structure. Journal of Management Studies. 49:
1351-1374.
Foss, N.J. 2002, 'New organizational forms: Critical perspectives', International Journal of the
Economics of Business, 9(1): 1-8.
Geneste, L. & Galvin, P. 2015. Trust and knowledge acquisition by small and medium-sized
firms in weak client–firm exchange relationships. International Small Business Journal,
33(3), 277-298.
Grant, R.M. 1996a, 'Prospering in dynamically-competitive environments: Organizational
capability as knowledge integration', Organization Science, 7(4): 375-87.
Grant, R.M. 1996b, Towards a knowledge-based theory of the firm' Strategic Management
Journal, vol. 17(Winter Special Issue): 109-22.
Grant, R.M., Baden-Fuller, C. 2004. A Knowledge Accessing Theory of Strategic Alliances.
Journal of Management Studies. 41(1) 61-84.
Grigoriou, K. & Rothaermel, F.T. 2017. Organizing for knowledge generation: Internal
knowledge networks and the contingent effect of external knowledge sourcing. Strategic
Management Journal, 38(2): 395-414.
Grossman, S.J. & Hart, O.D. 1986, The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of vertical and
lateral integration, The Journal of Political Economy, 94(4): 691-719.
Hamel, G. 1991, 'Competition for competence and inter partner learning within international
strategic alliances', Strategic Management Journal, 12(Special issue): 83-103.
Harrigan, K.R. 1984. Formulating Vertical Integration Strategies. Academy of Management
Review, 9(4): 638-652.

Page30

Hartmann, A., Davies, A. & Frederiksen, L. 2010. Learning to deliver service-enhanced public
infrastructure: balancing contractual and relational capabilities. Construction
Management and Economics, 28: 1165-1175.
Heide, J.B. 2003. Plural Governance in Industrial Purchasing. Journal of Marketing, 67(4): 1829.
Henderson, B.D. 1984. The application and misapplication of the experience curve. Journal of
Business Strategy, 4(3) 3-9.
Howard, M., Steensma, H.K. & Lyles, M. 2016. Learning to collaborate through collaboration:
how allying with expert firms influences collaborative innovation within novice firms.
Strategic Management Journal, 37(10): 2092-2103.
Inkpen, A.C. 2005. Learning through alliances: General Motors and NUMMI. California
Management Review,47(4): 114-36.
Jacobides, M. G. 2008. How Capability Differences, Transaction Costs, and Learning Curves
interact to shape vertical Scope. Organization Science, 19(2): 306-326.
Jacobides, M.G. & Billinger, S. 2006. Designing the boundaries of the firm: From "make, buy, or
ally" to the dynamic benefits of vertical architecture. Organization Science, 17(2): 24961.
Jacobides, M. G., Winter, S. G. 2005. The Co-Evolution of Capabilities and Transaction Costs:
Explaining the Institutional Structure of Production. Strategic Management Journal. 26(5):
395-413.
Jansen, J.P., van den Bosch, F.A.J. & Volberda, H. 2005. Managing potential and realized
absorptive capacity: how do organizational antecedents matter? Academy of Management
Journal. 48(6): 999-1015.
Jensen, M.C. & Meckling, W.H. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs
and ownership structure' Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4): 305-60.
Katz, D. & Kahn, R.L. 1966. The social psychology of organizations, Wiley, New York.
Khanna, T., Gulati, R. & Nohria, N. 1998. The dynamics of learning alliances: competition,
cooperation and relative scope. Strategic Management Journal, 19(3): 193-210.
Page31

Kogut, B. & Zander, U. 1992. Knowledge of the firm, combinative capabilities and the
replication of technology. Organization Science, 3(1): 383-397.
Krzeminska, A., Hoetker, G. & Mellewigt, T. 2013. Reconceptualizing plural sourcing. Strategic
Management Journal, 34(13): 1614-1627.
Lane, P.J. & Lubatkin, M. 1998. Relative absorptive capacity and interorganizational learning.
Strategic Management Journal, 19(5): 461-477.
Lavie, D. 2006. Capability Reconfiguration: An Analysis of Incumbent Responses to
Technological Change. Academy of Management Review, 31(1): 153-174.
Lawrence, P.R. & Lorsch, J.W. 1967. Differentiation and integration in complex organizations.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 12(1): 1-47.
Macher, J.T. & Richman, B.D. 2008. Transaction cost economics: An assessment of empirical
research in the social sciences. Business and Politics, 10(1), 1-63.
Makadok, R. & Coff, R. 2009. Both Market and Hierarchy: An Incentive-System Theory of
Hybrid Governance Forms. Academy of Management Review, 34(2): 297-319.
Miller, G., Dingwall, R. & Murphy, E. 2004. Using qualitative data and analysis: Reflections on
organizational research. In Qualitative research: theory, method and practice, ed. D.
Silverman London: Sage.
Nonaka, I. 1994. A dynamic theory of organizational knowledge creation. Organization Science
5(1): 14-37.
Nonaka, I. & Takeuchi, H. 1995. The knowledge-creating company: How Japanese companies
create the dynamics of innovation. New York: Oxford University Press.
Novak, S. & Eppinger, S.D. 2001. Sourcing by design: product complexity and the supply chain.
Management Science 47: 189–204.
Oxley, J.E., & Sampson, R.C. 2004. The scope and governance of international R&D alliances.
Strategic Management Journal, 25: 723–749.
Parmigiani, A. 2007. Why do firms make and buy? An Investigation of Concurrent Sourcing.
Strategic Management Journal. 28: 285-311.

Page32

Parmigiani, A. & Mitchell, W. 2009. Complementarity, Capabilities, and the Boundaries of the
Firm: The Impact of Within-firm and Inter-firm Expertise on Concurrent Sourcing of
Complementary Components. Strategic Management Journal. 30(10): 1065-1091.
Pollitt, C. & Bouckaert, G. 2000, Public management reform: A comparative analysis, Oxford
University Press, New York.
Poppo, L. & Zenger, T. 2002 Do formal contracts and relational governance function as substitutes
or complements? Strategic Management Journal. 23(8): 707-725.
Rice J., Liao, T., Martin, N. & Galvin, P. 2012. The role of strategic alliances in complementing
firm capabilities, Journal of Management & Organization, 18(6):858-869.
Siggelkow, N. 2007. Persuasion with case studies. Academy of Management Journal 50(1): 2024.
Soo, C., Devinney, T., Midgley, D. &Deering, A. 2002. Knowledge management: Philosophy,
processes and pitfalls. California Management Review 44(4): 129-150.
Styhre, A., Josephson, P.E. & Knauseder, I. 2004. Learning capabilities in organizational
networks: case studies of six construction projects. Construction Management and
Economics 22(9): 957-966.
Teece D.J. 2007. Explicating dynamic capabilities: the nature and microfoundations of
(sustainable) enterprise performance. Strategic Management Journal, 28: 1319-1350.
Teece, D.J., Pisano, G. & Shuen, A. 1997. Dynamic capabilities and strategic management.
Strategic Management Journal, 18(7): 509-33.
Thompson, J.D. 1967. Organizations in action: Social science bases of administrative theory,
McGraw Hill, New York.
Tywoniak, S.A. 2007, 'Knowledge in four deformation dimensions', Organization, 14(1): 53-76.
Williamson, O.E. 1975, Markets and hierarchies, analysis and antitrust implications: A study in
the economics of internal organization, Free Press, New York.
Williamson, O.E. 1985. The economic institutions of capitalism: Firms, markets, relative
contracting. New York: The Free Press.

Page33

Williamson, O.E. 1991. Comparative economic organization: The analysis of discrete structural
alternatives. Administrative Science Quarterly, 36(2): 269-96.
Wohlgemuth, V. & Wenzel, M. 2016. Dynamic capabilities and routinization. Journal of
Business Research, 69(5): 1944-1948.
Young, S. 2007. Outsourcing: Uncovering the complexity of the decision. International Public
Management Journal 10(3): 307-325.
Zheng, J., Roehrich, J.K. & Lewis, M.A. 2008. The dynamics of contractual and relational
governance: evidence from long-term public–private procurement arrangements. Journal
of purchasing and supply management, 14(1), 43-54.
Zollo M. & Winter S.G. 2002. Deliberate learning and the evolution of dynamic capabilities.
Organization Science, 13: 339-351.

Page34

Theme
Learning (individual)

Meaning
People work very
independently which limits
learning

Learning
(organization)

Learning is often restricted to
individual initiatives and not
systematic organizational
efforts

Boundary choices

Lack of clarity about the scope
of activities to be undertaken
by the organization versus
what should be outsourced.

Outsourcing/internal
operations

There is some attempt to learn
via outsourcing

Conflicting interests

Generally engaging the lowest
priced contractor limits both
quality and future learning.

Relationships with
contractors

Contractors engage with DHW
in an adversarial manner.

Review processes

There are no effective systems
and processes to learn when
contractors are used.

Textual Data
“So for a lot of people … what they know is
through their own experiences and they tend to
keep it to themselves today because the project
management environment doesn’t promote that
sort of informal interaction”.
“People worked on the basis that knowledge is
power to I’ll keep the knowledge to myself”.
“… there’s no interchange of knowledge [from
contractors]… they’re selected, they basically do
the work, we basically pay the bills and we
generally only pay lip service to [enhance]
capacity, to have any professional knowledge of
what’s going on”.
“We haven’t found the appropriate managerial
control of a Public Works agency … Where is the
border line? … I’ve advocated for a greater
degree of expertise centrally”.
“[It’s challenging], rebuilding capacity in an
environment where essentially lip service is paid
to rebuilding a public service entity”.
“… we’re having to build an understanding of
sustainability … so we send them over this
checklist, you’ve got to check that the work is
sustainable and as we up the ante we’ll have to
understand more about various sustainability
tolls and evaluation techniques. We are
struggling with that”.
“With the builders, it tends to be adversarial. We
try not to make it that way, but it tends to be …
“Here’s a very detailed set of documents, down
to the last bolt”. This is for a fixed price and
we’ve got a very tight contractor we manage you
with”.
“These firms have got a culture of, we are always
right, we are the professionals, we can’t be
wrong … It’s never, ever their fault”.
“So post-contract form of analysis? Very rarely
happens. Very, very rarely happens”.
“I’ve got a file …every email with a change, I’ve
stuck in there, but the changes are often verbal.
Once it’s sorted, I’ll either write it down or I’ll
stick a copy of the email into a file. It’s not very
methodical”.

Table 1: Key findings – Department of Housing and Works
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Theme
Learning (individual)

Learning
(organization)

Meaning
Learning occurs when faced
with new situations and is
reinforced through repetition
Sharing knowledge and
codifying this knowledge is
highly challenging

Boundary choices

Learning from contractors was
a high priority

Outsourcing/internal
operations

Learning from contractors is
possible when the same
activity is undertaken
internally.

Conflicting interests

Sharing knowledge with other
parties varies according to the
activity.
Learning from the activities of
organizations with whom you
outsource requires long-term
investment
Active engagement
throughout the process is
critical to build capabilities

Relationships with
contractors

Review processes

Textual Data
“sometimes you have to experience a few
problems to actually learn and improve … it’s an
individual thing”
“Our design people created a code of practice …
we’d pass onto every consultant [we worked
with]. There might be certain things that don’t
work, certain materials that do work in certain
situations … and it needs a lot of effort to receive
the information on how to do things better and
actually change the system quickly and
efficiently”.
“With contractors it is a little bit different … But
the Department has a strong emphasis on
partnering and relationship management”.
“We’re trying to do a little bit more of getting
input and involvement … from users than what
we have in the past”.
“… but we don’t do it [design] routinely and the
amount of work we’ve been doing has been
decreasing and so the idea … is to get some
hands on experience on the application of the
standards [to design] so that we can feed that
back into our standards”.
“… that construction arm is commercial guys, so
they’re less willing to share … They play those
games and so that’s actually hindering people”.
“We’re trying to work more cooperatively with
them [contractors] … they became very
antagonistic. … They’re finally realizing that
they’re in it for the long haul”.
“We hire consultants and contractors … Our
motivations were that we could learn …
Knowledge is fed back into standards and
specifications manuals”.

Table 2: Key findings – Queensland Main Roads
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Theme
Learning (individual)

Meaning
Building knowledge across
Main Roads and external
organizations is important.

Learning
(organization)

A key focus of the alliance
partnerships is knowledge
building and sharing.

Boundary choice

Alliances are used for large
projects and co-location is a
critical part of the alliance.

Outsourcing/internal
operations

Working with partner
organizations builds
knowledge and networks.

Conflicting interests

Consultative processes in the
alliance limited conflict.

Relationship with
contractors

Relationships were
collaborative, but different
cultures created challenges

Review processes

The process of learning is not
just from the alliance, but also
concerns how well the alliance
performs.

Textual Data
“I have organized an annual [training course]
which we run for project managers within Main
Roads … This year we will open it up to allow
local government”.
“Knowledge enhancement/ generation is a key
part of the alliance. During the workshops we
developed a strategic framework which included
a commitment that everyone would come out of
the alliance with enhanced skills”.
“The best part of the alliance is the proximity of
the constructor and [Main Roads employees] …
so they can bounce ideas off each other and the
constructor is actually part of the design team as
it unfolds”.
“The sharing of knowledge is a two way street
and no one is bleeding off anyone else. I have
enhanced my knowledge of design and
geotechnical issues, I know that the Main Roads
guys have a better understanding of contracting
issues”.
“Different organizations have a different culture,
behaviors, work ethic and time management …
“[with problems] we would discuss them on the
spot and in the vast majority of cases, the
problem didn’t come back again – we had a
solution to it”.
“Because of different cultures it has been a battle
from day one to build a team and have had to
constantly work on our team culture and
development. We have tried to get people out of
their huddles and focussed on creating a new
team with a unique identity”.
“We are documenting everything we do … We
are documenting the contracting award process,
all other processes and lessons learnt at each
critical milestone, ie once we finalized the
alliances agreement, preliminary design … There
is a very fluid interface between the alliance and
Main Roads WA – but not intrusive.

Table 3: Key findings – Main Roads WA
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Dept Housing & Works

Dept Housing & Works

Queensland Main Roads

Main Roads W.A.

Boundary Choice

Buy

Make

Dual-modes

Alliance

Formal effort to
build capabilities

Introduced the ‘Review
and Rebuild’ strategy.

Introduced the ‘Review
and Rebuild’ strategy.

Staff (including CEO) were
brought in on the basis of
their experience with
alliance contracting.

Logic for
boundary choice

Efficiency. DHW lacked
internal capabilities in
areas where it used
markets.

Efficiency across limited
areas of core business.
There was some effort to
learn by bringing activities
‘in-house’.

Boundary choice
changes

Each year more activities
have consistently been
outsourced as staff retired
and capabilities were lost.

Some work was brought
in-house in the areas of
sustainability etc. This did
not prove to be successful.

Factors restricting
capability
rebuilding

Contracts were awarded
on the basis of lowest cost
and thus contractors did
not have the margin to
work with DHW to assist
the capability building
process. Internal
knowledge (absorptive
capacity) was limited.
Virtually no learning
occurred. Learning was
extremely limited in these
arms’ length transactions.

Internal knowledge in new
areas was limited and
without this absorptive
capacity, it was difficult to
build capabilities.

The internal party – Road
Tek – continued to
undertake activities even
though most work was
outsourced.
The bulk of the work (80%)
was outsourced for
efficiency reasons, but
internal production
occurred to allow for
learning.
Internal production went
from 80% to 20% across
relevant activities. Efforts
were made to work with
contractors and learn from
them.
Many ‘hands-on activities’
were entirely outsourced
limiting opportunities for
new staff to work on-site.

Learning did occur and
allowed the organization
to be an ‘informed buyer
and to work with suppliers.

Significant learning
occurred and MRWA
became a contributor to
knowledge across the
industry.

Success in
boundary choice
assisting to
rebuild
capabilities

There was some limited
learning. It was more
around retaining rather
rebuilding capabilities.

Table 4: Key findings for each organization
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Need to build new
capabilities – even at the
expense of efficiency.

Large projects were
undertaken using alliance
contracting. Staff moved
between MRWA and the
contractor.
Staff involved in the
alliance benefited, but
embedding this knowledge
as a basis for new
capabilities was
challenging.

